2013-04-03 15:19:14
by Marianna Charountaki*
The emergence of the Kurdish issue has occupied Turkey’s domestic agenda for 30 years; however, it only became a matter of major concern with the capture of the leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), Abdullah Öcalan, in Kenya in 1999, and the US’s direct involvement, which put the Kurdish issue in the international spotlight. Since then Turkish decision-makers have had to face this issue openly.The importance of the Kurdish issue as a central factor in the analysis of Turkey’s “democratization,” of which its “Europeanization” process is a notable expression, is significant. This is even more evident today vis-à-vis the crisis the region is currently undergoing, considering the pressure stemming from Ankara’s Syrian policy, the strengthening of Ankara’s relations with the Kurdish region of northern Iraq -- which is a regional fact in tandem with official negotiations with the PKK’s leadership -- and even more governmental attempts to finalize a new constitution.
Within this context, the Kurdish factor in Turkey’s democratization attempts can actually be seen only as a positive element in the development of Turkey’s socio-political structure. Whereas writings on Kurdish-Turkish relations under the prism of Ankara’s potential EU accession have mostly examined the EU-Kurdish dimension as a one-way relationship, where the emphasis is on how the EU can provide the Kurds with legal recognition and a safer living environment, I argue that it is actually a dual process where the Kurdish issue also creates a demand for EU activity. The Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) Kurdish initiative in 2009, which paved the way for a political solution to the Kurdish issue, indicates a real change in Turkey’s Kurdish political discourse and practice since its rise in power from 2002 onwards. It is also a promising commitment that seemingly favors democratic reforms and thus it is inextricably linked with the implementation of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s policy of the “democratic opening.” Yet, many changes are needed. Not just to satisfy the EU’s Copenhagen criteria, but more importantly to link directly with the necessary alterations to Turkey’s proposed constitutional reforms, which can produce only positive changes for the majority of the society.
Turkey’s democratic opening, along with its European journey, is the result not only of Erdoğan’s policies but the supportive role played by the US from the era of President George W. Bush to the present day. However, the resolution of the Kurdish issue prior to an EU entrance holds great significance for the Kurds per se and for Turkish politics as well, considering the complications the country’s Middle Eastern policy is currently facing and will probably continue to face until the region’s political landscape is eventually settled. Not only would it be a contributing factor to Turkey’s acceptance by the EU and simplify the whole process, it would also result in a more mutually beneficial solution between the Kurds and Ankara. Turkey’s entrance into the EU thus seems dependent on an a priori political and peaceful resolution to the Kurdish issue. This can only be achieved through a compromise between the Kurdish and Turkish demands.
Accelerating democratic reforms
The question of how much time the Kurdish issue will take to be resolved is directly linked to the extent of the AKP’s desire to accelerate its policy of democratic reforms towards full democratization. Hence, the relationship between Turkey’s Kurdish issue and its democratization and Europeanization constitutes a “vicious triangle.” This triangle is a factor of the same recurring variables: It is dependent on the degree of cooperation between the government and Turkey’s democratic circles, the AKP’s democratic discourse depicted in the announcement of the Kurdish initiative in 2009, but most crucially on the AKP’s actual willingness to implement the necessary constitutional reforms.
A key factor in this has been Prime Minister Erdoğan’s success in controlling the country’s dominant military structure. Simultaneously, the critical role of the PKK in the current Syrian crisis, as well as the AKP’s need for Kurdish support in its plan to construct a new constitution, imply that Ankara should now consider the importance of gaining the cooperation of the Kurds as a key factor in the country’s democratization process. The progressive steps proposed under the governance of the AKP regarding Turkey’s Kurdish issue are some of the most promising signs for future developments the country has ever seen and the only green light at the moment that could end the long period of Kurdish waiting.
Yet, this compels Ankara to first acknowledge the creation of the PKK as a Kurdish reaction to the state’s security approach to the Kurdish issue and then to dissociate the latter from Turkey’s discourse on the issue of terrorism. It seems therefore that the AKP’s best bet is not only to convince Kurds through its secular policies but also to implement the necessary reforms and structural changes in order to achieve its goal of democratization by completing the country’s Europeanization process. However, this is entangled with the resolution of Turkey’s Kurdish issue. On the other hand, and in contrast to the 20th century’s Kurdish claims for independence, the Kurds nowadays interpret autonomy in terms consistent with the needs of the 21st century.
Thus, if the Turkish government indeed accepts the Kurdish offer as portrayed in the model of “democratic autonomy,” not only will the PKK phenomenon of the last 30 years be eliminated, but Turkey’s EU accession, and thus the country’s democratization, will finally be realized.
*Dr. Marianna Charountaki is a post-doctoral fellow at Reading University (UK). Her research interests range from international relations and foreign policy analysis to the international relations of the broader Middle East. She is the author of the book “The Kurds and US foreign policy: International Relations in the Middle East since 1945.”
InfoGnomon
The emergence of the Kurdish issue has occupied Turkey’s domestic agenda for 30 years; however, it only became a matter of major concern with the capture of the leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), Abdullah Öcalan, in Kenya in 1999, and the US’s direct involvement, which put the Kurdish issue in the international spotlight. Since then Turkish decision-makers have had to face this issue openly.The importance of the Kurdish issue as a central factor in the analysis of Turkey’s “democratization,” of which its “Europeanization” process is a notable expression, is significant. This is even more evident today vis-à-vis the crisis the region is currently undergoing, considering the pressure stemming from Ankara’s Syrian policy, the strengthening of Ankara’s relations with the Kurdish region of northern Iraq -- which is a regional fact in tandem with official negotiations with the PKK’s leadership -- and even more governmental attempts to finalize a new constitution.
Within this context, the Kurdish factor in Turkey’s democratization attempts can actually be seen only as a positive element in the development of Turkey’s socio-political structure. Whereas writings on Kurdish-Turkish relations under the prism of Ankara’s potential EU accession have mostly examined the EU-Kurdish dimension as a one-way relationship, where the emphasis is on how the EU can provide the Kurds with legal recognition and a safer living environment, I argue that it is actually a dual process where the Kurdish issue also creates a demand for EU activity. The Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) Kurdish initiative in 2009, which paved the way for a political solution to the Kurdish issue, indicates a real change in Turkey’s Kurdish political discourse and practice since its rise in power from 2002 onwards. It is also a promising commitment that seemingly favors democratic reforms and thus it is inextricably linked with the implementation of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s policy of the “democratic opening.” Yet, many changes are needed. Not just to satisfy the EU’s Copenhagen criteria, but more importantly to link directly with the necessary alterations to Turkey’s proposed constitutional reforms, which can produce only positive changes for the majority of the society.
Turkey’s democratic opening, along with its European journey, is the result not only of Erdoğan’s policies but the supportive role played by the US from the era of President George W. Bush to the present day. However, the resolution of the Kurdish issue prior to an EU entrance holds great significance for the Kurds per se and for Turkish politics as well, considering the complications the country’s Middle Eastern policy is currently facing and will probably continue to face until the region’s political landscape is eventually settled. Not only would it be a contributing factor to Turkey’s acceptance by the EU and simplify the whole process, it would also result in a more mutually beneficial solution between the Kurds and Ankara. Turkey’s entrance into the EU thus seems dependent on an a priori political and peaceful resolution to the Kurdish issue. This can only be achieved through a compromise between the Kurdish and Turkish demands.
Accelerating democratic reforms
The question of how much time the Kurdish issue will take to be resolved is directly linked to the extent of the AKP’s desire to accelerate its policy of democratic reforms towards full democratization. Hence, the relationship between Turkey’s Kurdish issue and its democratization and Europeanization constitutes a “vicious triangle.” This triangle is a factor of the same recurring variables: It is dependent on the degree of cooperation between the government and Turkey’s democratic circles, the AKP’s democratic discourse depicted in the announcement of the Kurdish initiative in 2009, but most crucially on the AKP’s actual willingness to implement the necessary constitutional reforms.
A key factor in this has been Prime Minister Erdoğan’s success in controlling the country’s dominant military structure. Simultaneously, the critical role of the PKK in the current Syrian crisis, as well as the AKP’s need for Kurdish support in its plan to construct a new constitution, imply that Ankara should now consider the importance of gaining the cooperation of the Kurds as a key factor in the country’s democratization process. The progressive steps proposed under the governance of the AKP regarding Turkey’s Kurdish issue are some of the most promising signs for future developments the country has ever seen and the only green light at the moment that could end the long period of Kurdish waiting.
Yet, this compels Ankara to first acknowledge the creation of the PKK as a Kurdish reaction to the state’s security approach to the Kurdish issue and then to dissociate the latter from Turkey’s discourse on the issue of terrorism. It seems therefore that the AKP’s best bet is not only to convince Kurds through its secular policies but also to implement the necessary reforms and structural changes in order to achieve its goal of democratization by completing the country’s Europeanization process. However, this is entangled with the resolution of Turkey’s Kurdish issue. On the other hand, and in contrast to the 20th century’s Kurdish claims for independence, the Kurds nowadays interpret autonomy in terms consistent with the needs of the 21st century.
Thus, if the Turkish government indeed accepts the Kurdish offer as portrayed in the model of “democratic autonomy,” not only will the PKK phenomenon of the last 30 years be eliminated, but Turkey’s EU accession, and thus the country’s democratization, will finally be realized.
*Dr. Marianna Charountaki is a post-doctoral fellow at Reading University (UK). Her research interests range from international relations and foreign policy analysis to the international relations of the broader Middle East. She is the author of the book “The Kurds and US foreign policy: International Relations in the Middle East since 1945.”
InfoGnomon
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